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A CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS OF THE REVOLT OF THE ADMIRALS

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of  
A CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS OF THE REVOLT OF THE ADMIRALS

Many of the crucial problems that plagued the U.S. military in the late 1940s are similar to those the armed forces face in the 1990s. The purpose of this paper is to use an historical perspective of the issues that ultimately led to the Revolt of the Admirals in 1949 and apply the lessons learned to the present day. The focus of the paper will be a comparison of the significant events involving armed forces unification during the 1945-1950 time frame with the current joint environment that has existed from 1986 to present day (post-Goldwater-Nichols Act). The paper will show how similar military environments can lead to similar problems and the need for the joint commander to employ his forces in a unified manner so that the unique capabilities of each service may be utilized. The conclusions are that for a joint force to succeed in battle, destructive inter-service rivalry must be minimized by ensuring each service is recognized for its own unique capabilities and each branch operates together in a setting of mutual cooperation and understanding. The unique roles and missions inherent with each service must be brought to bear by the joint commander to achieve a common military mission.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
ABSTRACT.....	ii
I INTRODUCTION.....	1
II POST WORLD WAR II DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT.....	3
III BOMBER VERSUS AIRCRAFT CARRIER.....	7
IV AGREEMENTS, DISAGREEMENTS, AND REVOLT.....	13
V APPLICATIONS TO PRESENT DAY.....	18
VI CONCLUSIONS.....	24
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	26

# A CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS OF THE REVOLT OF THE ADMIRALS

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The Problem. During the late 1940's the United States military was confronted with a number of organization issues that challenged the very foundation of its existence. With World War II won, there was a popular sentiment from both the President and Congress to cut defense spending, eliminate duplication of effort, and make the military more efficient. Unification of armed forces became a key issue which, in retrospect, was the beginning of the push for service jointness we see today. With the implementation of the National Defense Act of 1947, major changes were instituted throughout the military. Fundamental issues such as the primary roles and missions of individual services came into question. Inter-service rivalry soon developed as service branches, the Navy and Air Force in particular, jockeyed for control of key missions which would ensure the vitality of the service. This ultimately led to an incident which is known as the "Revolt of the Admirals" and will serve as the centerpiece for this paper. While the actual Revolt of the Admirals took place during Congressional hearings in October 1949, this paper will include the entire post-World War II unification effort in the context of the Revolt of the Admirals.

In view of the mandated joint environment of today's

military, the armed forces are again faced with many of the issues which culminated in the Admirals' Revolt in 1949. New technology, redefined roles and missions, and cuts in defense spending are common elements in both the late 1940s and 1990s. As such, the joint commander must come to grips with these issues as he attempts to employ the various forces at his command into a concerted team effort.

This paper will examine the issues involved with the post-World War II military unification effort, the reasons for disagreement between the services, and the ultimate fallout from the Revolt of the Admirals. The emphasis will then shift to application of these issues to the current day setting and discuss their relevancy (if any) to joint force operations. It will address the requirement for the Navy to shift to a more joint based mission, Goldwater-Nichols notwithstanding. Included will be how these issues may become problems for a joint force commander at the strategic/operational level and suggestions for overcoming these problems.

The thesis of this paper is that the potential conflict over armed services' roles and missions can lead to disruptive inter-service rivalry. Similar elements which produced disputes over roles and missions after World War II are present today and must be considered by the joint commander if a cohesive joint team is to be established.

## CHAPTER II

### POST WORLD WAR II DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT

Consider the following statement which describes the post war environment:

The American defense budget was starting to shrink, despite the expanding security obligations the United States faced in Western Europe and elsewhere. This austerity reflected [the President's] deep conviction that excessive spending threatened the strength of the United States. Perceiving the economic well being of the nation to be, in itself, one of the pillars of national strength (Allard 1989, 79).

While this quotation was from President Truman at the end of the Second World War, it could have just as easily been the sentiment of Presidents Clinton or Bush after the end of the Cold War or Desert Storm. With the war won and the United States as the sole superpower in its aftermath, there was a strong push from Congress (reflecting perceived public opinion) that the defense budget should be slashed and the money saved {or peace dividend in 1990s language} should be redirected into domestic programs. The resemblance of the situation to that of the 1990s is striking.

In addition to a reduction in defense spending there was a popular call to streamline the armed forces, reduce redundant missions, and increase the efficiency of their operations. The term unification was applied to the process of reshaping the services. The unification effort had a broad base of support, but none was more vocal or powerful on the

issue than President Truman. Throughout the war he had witnessed first hand many of the problems of coordination between services. "Wartime inter-service disputes - especially the bitter struggles between Nimitz and MacArthur - had received thorough scrutiny in the press." (Love 1992, 311) Truman was said to have a "fixation" with the issue of unification and it now had become a top priority in his post-war administration. Additionally, public opinion was weighing on the side of unification due in part to the findings of a joint Congressional Committee that concluded that inter-service rivalry had precluded the sharing of vital information that could have avoided the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. (Love 1992, 311) These were the first steps toward mandating a joint force structure for the United States armed services.

World War II had brought about dramatic advances in weapon technology that would also have profound impact on the armed forces. The United States was the sole possessor of the atomic bomb. Jet aircraft and advanced missile technology was being tested. Intercontinental bombers were being developed. Again, compare these issues with such technological developments as stealth systems, cruise missile capability, and space warfare initiatives of the 1990's military.

The reduction of defense spending coupled with the lack of any major opposing power, rapid changes in technology, and the push for unification left the armed forces scrambling for

mission identification. It was becoming quite clear in 1946 that significant changes would soon take place which would have a lasting impact. Testifying before Congress in 1945 on the unification issue Army Chief of Staff Dwight D. Eisenhower stated "The major lesson of World War II...was the crucial importance of unified command and unified theater actions, the mutual dependence of the services. The idea of separate ground, sea, and air operations..."was gone forever"." (Wolk 1988, 63)

The culmination of this unification effort resulted in the National Security Act of 1947 which brought about sweeping changes to the structure of the armed forces. In summary the law:

...Created the National Security Council to replace the three year old State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, established a cabinet-level Department of the Air Force, created a National Military Establishment, and authorized the new Secretary of Defense to oversee the Department of the Air Force, the renamed Department of the Army, and the Navy Department (Love 1992, 315).

Now there were three separate services in competition for a smaller defense budget and it soon became clear that the newly created Air Force would attempt to establish itself as the predominant force due to its perceived technological superiority over the other services. This superiority was based on the Air Force's proven capability to deliver atomic weapons using heavy bombers - a mission the Air Force coveted and had no intentions of sharing with the other services.

One crucial issue that the 1947 Act did not specifically address was the specific roles and missions that would be assigned to each armed forces branch. Navy leaders feared that an attempt might be made by the Air Force to take over control of all military combat aviation missions. The Marine Corps had similar fears that their amphibious mission would be absorbed into the Army.

Marine Corps leaders were equally concerned by the Army's attitude toward their service. They believed that the Army General Staff hoped to limit Marine effectiveness by preventing the formation of units larger than regiments and by achieving sharp cuts in the 100,000 man strength authorized for the corps in 1947 (Allard 1989, 75).

Storm clouds began to gather and battle lines were drawn in the months following enactment of the National Security Act as to what service would perform which missions and thus receive the larger slice of the defense budget pie. It was ironic that the inter-service rivalry and squabbles the 1947 Act had meant to end only intensified. This same point also applies to the inter-service rivalry which followed the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act during the post-Cold War environment.

### CHAPTER III

#### BOMBER VERSUS AIRCRAFT CARRIER

"The principle debate after 1947 involved the allocation of roles and missions between the individual services."

(Allard 1989, 75) The Air Force continued to push the issue of strategic bombing. They reasoned that since the United States was the only country that possessed nuclear weapons, the nation need only to have the capability to adequately deliver these weapons to any potential adversary in order to win future conflicts. The Air Force contended they were the logical service to execute this mission and thus should receive budgetary priority over the other services.

In December 1948, *Reader's Digest*, in cooperation with the U.S. Air Force began publishing a series of highly pejorative and sensational articles which argued, in effect, that a fleet of intercontinental atomic bombers, such as the newly operational B-36, could achieve national security, and that therefore the Navy could be relegated to combatting submarines and escorting convoys. Thus, the bulk of financial resources should go to the Air Force to build, maintain, and operate a fleet of bombers (Stafford 1990, 46).

As the successor to the war proven B-29 bomber, the B-36 soon became the symbol for Air Force dominance of the post-war military. The Convair B-36 was designed as the premier intercontinental bomber and the backbone of the Air Force inventory. The bomber initially featured a six engine push propeller design but was later modified to also include four turbojet engines in two pods which could lift the

aircraft to 40,000 ft at speeds of 435 MPH. The payload was 10,000 pounds of bombs. The Air Force planned to have a fleet of 249 planes by the end of FY 1951 (USNI Proceedings 1949, 1196).

The importance that the strategic mission would play in the new military establishment was obvious. The Navy realized it was becoming a victim of advancements in technology by not having a distinctive strategic bombing mission of its own. Therefore it launched an initiative to develop a carrier based aircraft that was capable of delivering nuclear weapons and a new design for an aircraft carrier that could incorporate new technology necessary to support this mission.

Early jet aircraft accelerated slowly, and the catapults on Navy carriers in service in 1945 were not strong enough to assist the early jets to launch speed. The situation worsened when planes carried nuclear weapons. Such aircraft needed special boost engines to lift off a carrier's deck. Indeed, one reason the Navy so strongly opposed service unification in 1946 was because it seemed that the Army Air Forces were correct in their claim that carrier aircraft had no future role in strategic warfare (Hone 1989, 17).

What was at stake here was the future of the aircraft carrier in future military operations. If, in fact, the United States relied on intercontinental bombers to deliver atomic weapons as the cornerstone of national defense, the role of both the United States Navy and Marine Corps would be reduced at best to a secondary supporting role in the new unified military. "The Navy was well aware that atomic bombs were the glamour

weapons of the day and that a capability to deliver these devices could further its claims for large appropriations."

(Allard 1989, 77)

The Navy in effect launched a three prong offensive against the Air Force strategic role domination. Included in this effort were the development of a new class of aircraft carrier capable of supporting large bombers, the development of carrier based aircraft that could deliver atomic weapons, and the collection of data that would undermine the B-36 as a superior intercontinental bomber.

The new carrier quickly became the symbol of the Navy (just as the B-36 symbolized the Air Force) during the rivalry for roles and missions. The supercarrier would be the foundation for the Navy's struggle to maintain an equitable portion of the defense budget. The lead ship was to be named the U.S.S. *United States* (CVA-58) - a 65,000 ton behemoth that was to become the centerpiece for the Navy's post-war fleet. Chief of Naval Operations Louis Denfield justified the carrier by arguing it could operate heavier aircraft than its WWII predecessors, could operate a larger number of aircraft, could carry more fuel for sustained operations, could carry more defensive armament and radar, and had more armor thus making it less susceptible to enemy attack. (Meilinger 1989, 84)

For airborne delivery of atomic weapons, the Navy initially relied on the "rugged prop-driven Douglas AD-1

Skyraider" which was followed by conversion of "twelve P2V Neptune land-based patrol bombers...converted to carry heavy atomic bombs." With the advent of advanced jet propulsion technology, a new aircraft design, the AJ Savage, which was an auxiliary-jet bomber, replaced the Neptune. (Love 1992, 327) In an effort to demonstrate the capability of carrier based aircraft to deliver atomic weapons at long range, the Navy staged several exercises designed to advertise the atomic mission. The P2V showed particular promise in an intercontinental mission having demonstrated the ability to fly in excess of 10,000 miles unrefueled. (USNI Proceedings 728, 1949). The Navy saw these demonstration flights as historic in nature because they "...demonstrated that large aircraft can fly off a carrier with ease" and "...gave naval aviators new hope for the future." (USNI Proceedings 1949, 1131)

The Navy also stepped up its effort to discredit the B-36 as an "obsolescent propeller-driven model trying to survive in a jet age." The Navy highlighted the fact that new jet aircraft in U.S. inventory had the capability of intercepting the B-36 at high altitudes and it was only a matter of time before potential adversaries (i.e. the Soviet Union) had similar capability. This limitation, the Navy asserted, would require the bomber be escorted by fighter aircraft to achieve its mission both during day and night operations.

(Schratz 1986, 66). The Navy also "...organized a special secret office within the Pentagon called OP-23, a planning group led by Captain Arleigh Burke, whose purpose was to carry the fight for the *United States* to Congress and the public." (Meilinger 1989, 81) The OP-23 charter also called for it to "gather material critical of the B-36's performance and capabilities." (Wolk 1988, 66)

The Air Force in turn viewed the Navy's actions as an effort to take over its strategic delivery role and to undermine their ability to operate as a separate service branch. The two services continued to hurl discrediting statements and insults at each other.

As early as July 1947 General Vandenburg {Air Force Chief of Staff} had expressed his thoughts to Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington on the proposed supercarrier. To his mind aircraft carriers were inadequate weapons because, among other reasons, the aircraft they carried had short range and a poor altitude performance (Meilinger 1989, 85)

The bottom line and significant importance to the contemporary setting is that armed forces that were supposed to be unified by law to fight against common enemies of the United States were instead fighting each other. This inter-service rivalry took place at the highest levels of leadership - from service secretaries on down. The U.S. military branches treated each other with deceit and distrust. There was little attempt at mutual understanding of differing points of view - hardly a foundation to face the challenges of the

Cold War. "In retrospect, it is evident that neither the Navy nor the Air Force fully understood each other's position. If misperceptions can lead to wars between nations, they also may promote conflicts between bureaucracies." (Allard 1989, 78)

## CHAPTER IV

### AGREEMENTS, DISAGREEMENTS, AND REVOLT

In an attempt to settle the debate over service roles and missions, the first Secretary of the newly created Office of Defense, James Forrestal, called a meeting of the heads of the service branches to iron out inter-service differences and hopefully come to some mutual understandings. Convened at Key West, Florida in March 1948 the result was a list of primary and secondary missions for each service. What was conspicuously missing from the proceedings was which service would "be the agent for the Joint Chiefs in controlling strategic nuclear air warfare." A follow-on meeting was held in Newport, Rhode Island in August 1948 to address this specific question. "The service chiefs agreed that strategic air warfare would indeed be the responsibility of the Air Force, but they also agreed that the Air Force had to accept whatever strategic capability the Navy carriers could offer." (Hone 1989, 22) It is interesting to note that a similar study was undertaken by the Defense Department in 1993 to address the need to revise roles and missions of the armed forces. This review process, however, is now mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act which requires "...the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "to periodically recommend such changes in the assignment of

functions (or roles and missions) as the chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the armed forces." (Defense 1993, 17)

Much of the fervor quieted for the remainder of 1948 as attention was shifted to the crisis in Berlin and the associated airlift. In January 1949 President Truman, fresh from victory in the previous year's presidential election, named Louis Johnson as the new Secretary of Defense to replace Forrestal. When Johnson took office as Defense Secretary in March, he stated that his intentions were to make substantial changes to the Defense Department by "slashing the Marine Corps, eliminating the Navy's role in strategic bombardment, and merging naval aviation into the Air Force then headed by Truman's protege, Secretary Stuart Symington of Missouri." (Love 1992, 319)

The keel of the previously authorized supercarrier *United States* had been laid at Newport News, Virginia in early April 1949. On April 23rd after conferring with the President and the Joint Chiefs (less the CNO) Secretary Johnson reversed the decisions made at Key West and Newport and decided to cancel the construction of the carrier. This event sent an "immediate and violent explosion" throughout the Navy. (Coletta 1981, 135) Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan, who had not even been given the courtesy of advance notification of the cancellation, resigned in protest. The

battle over unification became more fierce than ever. With the loss of the *United States* went the Navy's best hope at ensuring it maintained a strategic bombing mission into the 1950s. The Navy now appeared destined to filling a back seat, supporting role in the post-war military structure.

"The aborted aircraft carrier became the crux of the entire inter-service issue of unification and postwar strategy." (Schratz 1986, 65) Insults and accusations continued unabated between the services. There were allegations of procurement wrongdoings in the letting of the B-36 contracts. It was alleged that Secretary Johnson favored the B-36 because of business dealings with the lead contractor through which he stood to make personal gains. The turmoil created during the Spring of 1949 resulted in a series of Congressional hearings designed to investigate accusations of possible conflicts of interest, the cancellation of the carrier, and the suitability of the B-36 as an intercontinental bomber. Conducted in two segments held in August and October 1949, these hearings constituted the heart of the Revolt of the Admirals. During the October congressional hearings:

Senior Navy officers publicly and privately charged that the Army and Air Force were trying to destroy naval aviation in order to reduce Navy influence in the military establishment (Dupuy 1986, 1329).

In effect the Defense Department was airing its dirty laundry

in public which created embarrassment for both the President and the defense organization. The event was viewed by many as open mutiny by the Navy. During the 24 day session, testimony was taken from such high ranking officers as General Clifton B. Cates, Commandant of the Marine Corps; General Omar Bradley, Army Chief of Staff; Fleet Admirals Nimitz, Halsey, and King; Admiral Denfield, Chief of Naval Operations; Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet; Admiral William H.P. Blandy, Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet; Thomas C. Kinkaid; and Admiral Raymond B. Spruance. (Stafford 1990, 47-49)

The admirals' arguments fell into three main categories: the concept of an "Atomic blitz" was a poor strategy in the event of war; the B-36 was a substandard aircraft that could not successfully carry out the blitz even if it were an acceptable strategy; and the Navy was being treated as an unequal partner in the defense establishment as evidenced by the cancellation of the *United States* (Meilinger 1989, 90-91).

The final report from the hearings was issued in March 1950 with the following results:

- a. The Navy was wrong in its assertions that the B-36 was a defective weapon system.
- b. Secretary Johnson acted in a deplorable manner when he cancelled the *United States*.
- c. The U.S. military air strength would consist of Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps assets. Strategic bombing was just one of the many missions of an air power.

d. It also called for adding the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman be rotated among the services every two years.

e. The report denied that the Naval witnesses were acting in a manner which was inappropriate. (Allard 1989, 82-83)

f. The cancellation of the *United States* and deep defense budget cuts were allowed to stand. (Schratz 1986, 67)

In the aftermath of the hearings Admirals Blandy and Bogan were forced into retirement. "Admiral Denfield was removed as CNO a week after the hearings and only the personal intervention of President Truman in Captain Burke's behalf thwarted subsequent attempts to block his promotion to rear admiral." (Schratz 1986, 67)

## CHAPTER V

### APPLICATIONS TO PRESENT DAY

Internal "friction" caused by excessive rivalries may also confront military forces from time to time. The desire to excel and the competition of differing points of views are indispensable to healthy military organizations. However, there is no place for rivalry that seeks to undercut or denigrate fellow members of the joint team; we must harness all our energies for dealing with our enemies (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1991, 4).

It is clear from the quotation above that the very issues that led to the Revolt of the Admirals over 45 years ago remain a potential for conflict in today's military establishment. With the enactment of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, the foundation of the post-Cold War military became the joint force concept, much as unification was the driving concept during the late 1940s. The education of officers in joint matters to promote understanding and interoperability is now mandated. But just how far have we come as a military in working as a true joint team? Are there current issues that would tend to polarize the services? Are we doomed to repeat the hard learned lessons of the past in terms of roles and missions or did we ever learn the lessons in the first place? Perhaps the issues which faced the military in the late 1940s were only eclipsed by the Korean War.

The environment for the military of the 1990s is very similar in nature to the setting that faced the armed forces after World War II. The vanquished Axis powers have been

replaced by the dismantled Warsaw Pact. The slashing of the Defense Department budget is a reality much like that of the late 1940s.

For over two years the services have been downsizing to meet force levels recommended by CJCS and adopted by the Bush administration. Added budget savings proposed by the Clinton administration mean more cuts. Thus, while the military has enjoyed operational successes since 1986, shrinking budgets and force structures will make future operations more challenging. This is not unlike the situation in 1947 which was difficult for defense planners and placed pressure on the military to address "difficult questions being asked by Congress and the American people" (Chiarelli 1993, 74).

Advanced technology weapons are still viewed as a means of staking claim to a unique role and/or mission. Whereas atomic weapons were on the forefront of technology after WWII, today theater ballistic missile defense, laser weapons, space application, and cruise missile offensive and defensive weapons dominate the scramble for research, development, and procurement dollars. The B-36 relied on high altitude to escape enemy defenses, today the B-2, F-117, and Burke class destroyers rely on stealth technology to avoid detection.

Even without the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Navy had to embrace a joint mission as the foundation of its contemporary strategy. The pretense of a large adversarial Navy such as that of the Soviet Union no longer exists. The need for numerous ASW assets to counter a large nuclear submarine fleet is gone. Navy operations today are focused primarily near the land in the littorals. Essentially it is a blue-water navy

that is now performing a brown-water mission. "The Navy and Marine Corps Team is changing in response to the challenges of a new security environment. The shift in strategic landscape means that Naval Forces will concentrate on littoral warfare and maneuver from the sea." (Department of the Navy 1992, 10). The concentration for the Navy must focus on support of land forces if it is to remain a viable partner in joint warfare. As Toti points out "...according to our refocused doctrine, we should neither plan nor conduct a naval operation unless it directly supports a specific land campaign objective." (1992, 70) This mission could be compared with the strategic role in which the Navy fought to participate in 1947.

Today the strategic nuclear role has been significantly diminished. The Air Force bombers have been stood down from a heightened alert status. Most nuclear weapons have been removed from surface ships. The Army and Marine Corps no longer have nuclear weapons in their inventory.

The organization of our nuclear forces has been changed fundamentally. For the first time, all of America's strategic bombers, missiles and submarines are under one commander, either an Air Force general or a Navy admiral. This arrangement, hard to imagine only a few years ago, represents perhaps the most dramatic change in the assignment of roles and missions among the services since 1947 (Defense 1993, 19).

So what of the roles and missions of the other services? Could inter-service rivalry again raise its ugly head? What if, for example, the space environment, through technological

advances, became the dominant arena for defense spending.

Would our armed forces equally share a role in space warfighting?

Consider the following quote from an Air Force white paper:

No other resource in our security arsenal brings together the reach, flexibility and precise firepower inherent in the land-based bomber force we are developing. ...Bombers have inherent strengths no other weapon system can match. Their combination of range, payload and flexibility makes bombers the theater commander's weapons of choice for both crisis response and sustained operations (Department of the Air Force 1992, 1).

While this is a contemporary plug for the role of the bomber in strategic bombing missions, it could just as easily have been an advertisement for the 1947 B-36 mission. James L. George in his article "Where's the Admirals' Revolt" addresses the need for the Air Force to search for new priorities in the current environment:

As can be readily seen, the Air Force faces a major missions dilemma in the new post-Cold War era. Two of their three Cold War major missions - strategic bombing and ICBMs - are rapidly and surely going away, while for a variety of reasons, all three of their secondary missions {Close Air Support, Airlift, and Conventional Long-Range Bombing} are questionable (George 1993, 68).

The examples of potential adversarial relationships between services continues. In an editorial by retired Marine Corps Brigadier General James D. Hittle, he counters arguments by two prominent Army generals who assert that the Marines are a service redundancy. He answers the charges that "Marine

amphibious forces...are less and less relevant to modern warfare," and "four divisions of Marine Forces are an antique luxury." (Hittle 1994, 29) Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, asked in July 1992 if the "naval aviation and the Marine Corps were still required." (Cropsey 1993, 73).

To combat the tendency towards service parochialism, joint commanders must be able to foster a true military team concept where each service contributes in its own unique way to achievement of a common mission. Emphasis should concentrate on inter-operability of existing forces and not simply the absorption of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps into one large joint warfighting unit. There will be, however, situations where specific services take a lead and decisive role in future conflicts based on the needed capability. If recent past history is any indication, this lead service arrangement will be the rule vice the exception. The Army's role in Operation Just Cause and the Navy's role in the Achille Lauro crisis are only two examples. This does not diminish the need for all services to contribute in a supporting manner to the mission accordingly.

While disruptive rivalry, as was the situation during the Revolt of the Admirals, is unsatisfactory to a joint warfighting team, constructive competition between forces may be beneficial. The joint commander must be able to recognize

the difference between these two and apply competition in a manner that promotes a cooperative environment.

Properly structured service competition does not waste money and actually promotes higher levels of efficiency and innovation. Creative competition can exist if a common strategic mission is clearly established, common criteria for success are identified and understood, and no one service is allowed to rig the game by establishing a little empire within which it is autonomous and invulnerable and thus able to achieve parochial goals (Rosen 1993, 36).

Clearly the need for mutual understanding, cooperation, and inter-operability among the armed forces has never been greater. While a joint force structure has been mandated, the tendency still remains for services to concentrate more on parochial and self serving issues that lead to the destructive elements of inter-service rivalry that unification in the 1940s and jointness in 1990s was designed to eliminate.

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSIONS

Military jointness and the requirement it mandates to work as a unified team are undeniably the preferred application of U.S. force now and in the future. However the current joint structure in the U.S. military has the potential to lead to problems for the joint commander. The key factors that effected our military during the late 1940s were the post war draw down, the armed service unification issue, new technology, and reduced budgets. Today's post-Cold War environment, reduced defense budgets, new technology weapons, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act requiring a joint military, are very similar in nature.

While the joint goal is to fight as a coherent team, the unique roles and missions of the separate services should not be overlooked. The joint commander must ensure that all available capabilities are thoroughly examined so that the best mix of forces is employed for unity of effort. Additionally, inter-operability of forces is a key factor in successful achievement of a joint mission. "The significance here is that the relative utility of different service forces will be assessed increasingly in terms of how they help other service forces perform their respective specialties." (Blaker 1992, 61) Recognition of unique roles and missions with consistent across-the-board application will help reduce

inter-service rivalry. The sometimes subtle difference between constructive competition and destructive, petty service rivalry must be recognized and understood by joint commanders.

The goal of the joint commander should be to recognize service uniqueness and integrate the best capabilities of all service branches into a cohesive team without causing situations which will promote inter-service rivalry. "Failure to do so is likely to lead to an erosion of the distinctive abilities of the military disciplines from whose differences-ironically-the rationale for jointness {and unification in 1947} originally springs." (Cropsey 1993, 72)

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